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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the times of the Socratic philosophers, thinkers have considered categories
as defined by a set of rules that determine what items are in, and what items are out, of a
category. This viewpoint was challenged by a series of studies performed by Eleanor
Rosch and her colleagues who found that people did not view category members as
starkly in or out of a category as would be expected if there were strict rules that
governed category membership, but instead found graded membership where some items
were more or less in a category than others (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Since inclusivity
rules did not seem to govern category membership, Rosch et al. explored a category
structuring proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein that categories were defined by a loose
affiliation of attributes – a family resemblance, where each member: a) had more of a
selection of attributes that were shared by other members of their category, and b) had
less of a selection of attributes that were shared by members outside of their category
(Wittgenstein, 1953). To paraphrase Wittgenstein’s famous example, the best example of
a game would have the most attributes shared by other games: rules, teams, a ball, etc.
Similarly, this best example game would lack the features common to other categories:
the limbs of an animal, the flat surface of furniture, the careful consideration of
international diplomacy, etc.
Rosch and Mervis tested this theory in a series of experiments by having some
subjects list attributes of basic level categories (e.g., different types of chairs) as well as
having others list attributes of subcategory members of superordinate categories (e.g.,
different types of furniture) (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Investigating the first part of the
family resemblance claim, they found that for both category members and basic level
categories, the category members that had many overlapping attributes with their fellow
category members were rated as more prototypical of their category – that is, better
examples of their category – by subjects in an earlier experiment. As for the second part
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of the family resemblance claim, Rosch et al. had subjects list attributes of car and chair
exemplars and looked to see how frequently those attributes overlapped with other
members of the vehicle and furniture superordinate category respectively. They found a
significantly negative correlation, such that the fewer attributes an item had overlapping
with other category members, the more prototypical it was rated of its category.
It seems that with existent categories, then, people are sensitive to multiple
attributes of a category and the distribution of those attributes in the makeup of category
structure. Importantly, this type of category structuring was not predicted by thousands
of years of introspecting on the nature of categorization, indicating that our categorization
behavior does not spring from a clear cut and methodical examination of our
surroundings (as occurs in scientific taxonomy) but instead arises from a non-conscious
predilection for ordering the world according to certain implicit rules.
It was for this reason that it was so surprising when a study by Medin,
Wattenmaker, and Hampson indicated that people don’t create family resemblance
categories when sorting exemplars in the lab (Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987).
In their first of a series of experiments, they gave subjects instances of cartoon bugs that
had been created in one of two categories, each with a prototype and four perturbations
that deviated from the prototype in only one of its four dimensions. They found that
subjects were unwilling to sort these exemplars using a family resemblance strategy that
placed each prototype with its perturbations; instead, every subject picked a single feature
dimension and sorted based on that dimension.
In later experiments, Medin et al. tried a number of methods to induce their
participants to use a family resemblance method to categorize. Rosch and Mervis’
original studies indicate that family resemblance sorting is the sort which maximizes the
within category resemblance while minimizing the between category resemblance (Rosch
& Mervis, 1975). In accordance with this, Medin et al. tried adding more dimensions to
the stimuli in order to increase the extent to which family resemblance sorting would
2

maximize within category resemblance while minimizing between category
resemblances. In another attempt to get subjects to create family resemblance sorting,
they made each dimension have three potential values so that subjects should be unable to
pick one dimension and divide the exemplars into two categories. Medin et al. also tried:
using verbal descriptions of the exemplars instead of pictures, having each trait
instantiated in different ways for each verbal description (e.g., if the dimension is
carefulness, one person was described as conscientious, another as exacting), highlighting
the prototype of each category, and having subjects consider the genetic evolution of each
category. None of these manipulations created a notable amount of family resemblance
sorting.
Potential Explanations –Existent Knowledge
Why do subjects in laboratory settings categorize based on a single dimension?
One possible answer is that subjects have no reason to attend to multiple dimensions. In
their study of family resemblance categorization, Medin et al. conclude that background
knowledge of the dimensions of a category is sufficient to induce subjects to focus on
more than one dimension and create family resemblance categories (Medin et al., 1987).
In one set of experiments where the stimuli were descriptions of people, they found that
when all of the dimensions related to extroversion/introversion, with dimensions such as
outgoing vs. sad and entertaining vs. inhibited, about 25% of the subjects picked up on
the structuring and constructed their categories based on an overall sense of how
introverted or extroverted each exemplar was. Furthermore, when they told subjects that
some of the people were extroverted while others are introverted, a majority of subjects
categorized based on a family resemblance strategy rather than categorizing
unidimensionally. Medin et al. also added background knowledge to the dimensions of
their insect drawings by making one category have features useful for flying (e.g., having
a small body and beak) and the other having features not useful for flying. Subjects were
3

willing/able to attend to multiple dimensions once their background knowledge tied these
dimensions together.
The importance of using background knowledge in creating family resemblance
categories was supported in a study by Spalding and Murphy in which subjects are shown
category exemplars in which the features are either integrated to relate to a theme or were
unrelated to a theme (Spalding & Murphy, 1996). For example, one pair of categories in
the integrated condition were composed of features relating to either an arctic vehicle
(made in Norway, heavily insulated, white, etc.) or an equatorial vehicle (made in Africa,
lightly insulated, green, etc.) while the unrelated condition just had two categories each
with car features (color, transmission type, interior) differing between the two categories.
In both conditions, their exemplars also had a feature randomly assigned to each (e.g.,
location of license plate) that was always present and cut across category to allow
subjects to categorize based on a single dimension. Spalding and Murphy found that
subjects who were asked to sort the exemplars with the integrated features were more
likely to create family resemblance categories and less likely to create unidimensional
sorts as compared to the subjects in the unrelated condition. Again, background
knowledge was a sufficient component to get subjects to attend to multiple dimensions.
It seems, then, that subjects use themes to make sense of why multiple dimensions
are important. When subjects believe an item’s dimensions are related to a theme, they
are able to integrate those dimensions and use them to evaluate whether sets of features
fit into that theme. In a family resemblance structured category, each exemplar is not
going to have the same set of features. If subjects can recognize the overall theme that
distinguishes the two categories, they will see if the features present fit into the overall
theme. Spalding and Murphy found that this was not an automatic process, for when
subjects just sorted the exemplars without reading them over first, they sorted the
integrated feature categories by family resemblance significantly less than subjects who
were asked to read the cards before sorting. This indicates that without thinking about
4

how the features in each exemplar are related to each other, the subjects won’t have an
incentive to access their background knowledge when categorizing and therefore will
have less incentive to attend to multiple dimensions.
This does not mean, however, that categorization requires a lot of accessing of
background knowledge. A study by Kaplan and Murphy showed subjects exemplars
from two categories, each of which had six features of which only one was indicative of a
larger theme that tied the exemplars together into a category (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999).
They found that when this division of this thematic dimension was aligned with the
general family resemblance structure of the two categories, subjects picked up on the
structuring to a significantly greater degree. Kaplan and Murphy also showed that
subjects were not just creating an abstract but singular dimension out of the theme and
sorting on that dimension, because when the division of the thematic dimension ran
orthogonal to the rest of the category structures, very few subjects sorted along that
theme.
Potential Solutions – Created Knowledge
In addition to relying upon existent knowledge, it appears that family resemblance
categories can be built upon knowledge created inside the lab. One way to generate
knowledge in the lab is to manipulate how subjects interact with the exemplars they are
going to categorize. In their review paper on the impact of category use on category
structuring, Markman and Ross theorize that differences in category structuring are due
to the tasks that subjects are asked to perform when they learn the categories (Markman
& Ross, 2003). Specifically, classification tasks focus subjects’ attention on what
differentiates between categories while inference tasks focus subject’s attention on the
internal structure of the category, making subjects in inference tasks more likely to reflect
these relationships between dimensions in the categories they create. It is these
relationships that prompt subjects to create the complex family dimension categories.
5

As part of their evidence, Markman and Ross cite a study by Lasaline and
Murphy that shows subjects create differently structured categories depending on their
initial interactions with the information that they are categorizing (Lassaline & Murphy,
1996). In two experiments, subjects looked at a set of exemplars (animals, novel bugs,
etc.), with some subjects either making judgments about the frequencies of their
properties (e.g., how many have a short tail?) while others made inductive judgments
about the relationship between the properties (e.g., if this animal has a short tail, what
kind of teeth does it have?). For both existent and fictitious objects, Lassaline and
Murphy found that the subjects who make induction judgments were three times more
likely to create family resemblance categories than subjects in both the frequency
judgments and the mere observation conditions. They take this as evidence that subjects
in the typical category construction task will not go through the effort to attend to
multiple dimensions unless they are given incentive to, such as needing to distribute
attention across dimensions in order to complete the induction task.
Potential Solutions – No Knowledge
It appears that one solution to the problem of single dimension categorization is
tapping into subjects’ background knowledge, whether the subjects brought that
knowledge into the experiment with them or if it was generated in the experiment before
the categorization occurs. Outside of the province of categorization, there have been
some studies that indicate subjects might be making multidimensional category
judgments without tapping into background knowledge. For instance, in a study that
investigated the dissociation between recognition memory and categorization, Knowlton
and Squire showed amnesic and normal controls a series of dot patterns that were all
permutations of a prototype (Knowlton & Squire, 1993). These images were a series of
dots that varied across the x and y dimensions in the vein of Posner and Keele’s classic
dot pattern experiments (Posner & Keele, 1968). Some of these patterns had dots that
6

were randomly distributed across the screen while others had dots positioned as a
permutation of a prototype shape. After a brief waiting period, subjects were shown new
patterns and asked both if the images came from the same set as the original training
patterns as well as if they had seen that particular pattern before. Although the amnesiacs
performed worse than normals at recognizing old patterns, they performed comparably at
saying whether the patterns belonged to the category presented during training. A follow
up study by Palmeri and Flanery showed the same stimuli to normal subjects who
believed that they had subliminally seen the training patterns but in reality had not seen
them, therefore approximating amnesiacs (Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). These subjects
were also able to correctly categorize the dot patterns after a few trials to a similar level
as the subjects in the Knolton and Squire experiment, but were unable to “recognize” the
“trained” patterns (as expected, since they had never seen them).
Taken together, these studies hint that people can be sensitive to a
multidimensional pattern when shown a series of category members. Subjects in these
experiments had no background knowledge of the dot patterns and did not rely on them
to perform a task, yet they still identified members of a category that was distributed
across two visual dimensions. These studies indicate that subjects can be induced to
categorize in a complex fashion without appealing to their background knowledge, either
directly or through using the features to perform a task. However, both experiments used
the same stimuli, in which the “in-category” dot pattern was an upside down “U” shape.
It seems possible that subjects could learn the category by noticing that this shape keeps
reappearing, rather than attending to the location of each set of dots in their two spatial
dimensions. While this may not be problematic for the original experiments, it may be
for the present one because it deals explicitly with whether people will spontaneously
create categories that are dependent on multiple dimensions.
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Potential Solutions – Minimal Feedback
While most people don’t create categories for a living, everyone must learn a
large quantity of categories (a type of personal category creation). When learning new
categories, people never receive the type of feedback seen in most categorization
experiments. That is, they do not get continual corrective feedback. First, most
categorization decisions are non-verbalized and so feedback is unlikely in these
conditions (even the most precocious child won’t say “doggy” every time they see a dog).
Second, people rarely give feedback on an explicit but correct categorization except for
the feedback of smooth communication, and sometimes will fail to give feedback on an
explicit and incorrect categorization, either due to politeness or indifference. Perhaps a
more natural feedback structure during a categorization experiment would promote
complex category creation.
Potential Solutions – Minimal Knowledge
Outside of the lab, a person rarely creates a new category without some
knowledge of the field that the category exists in or a theory about what they are going to
find. For instance, a botanist may identify a new type of flower based on their already
existent knowledge of the important components of plants combined with their
knowledge of what has already been classified by science. While their general
knowledge of the field of botany is maximal, their knowledge related to the category they
are creating prior to their creation of it is minimal. It is only in the grouping of these
items and their comparison to old groups that real knowledge is created. This type of
knowledge can be contrasted with the type of knowledge used in the category creation
experiments of Spalding and Murphy where subjects already knew much about the
categories and would have been able to predict features (Spalding & Murphy, 1996). It is
possible, then, that prior knowledge of the dimensions that makeup a category or the
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existence of other, similar categories would be sufficient to spur complex category
creation.
In light of these findings and hypotheses, I conducted three experiments to test
whether subjects can create categories using multiple dimensions without using their
knowledge of the objects they are categorizing or the categories these objects are being
sorted into. The first experiment is a variation on the Knowlton and Squire, and Palmeri
and Flanery experiments designed to test how well their findings generalize to stimuli
with unassociated dimensions. The second experiment tests whether subjects will create
multidimensional categories if they are given infrequent feedback on the quality of their
categorization performance. The third experiment tests whether people can create a new
multidimensional category consisting of previously unseen stimuli mixed in with stimuli
whose categories are already known.

9

CHAPTER 2
GENERAL METHODS
Participants
Participants in each of these experiments were undergraduate students at the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. They were all enrolled in various psychology
courses that allowed participation in experiments in return for extra credit, and they each
received two credits in return for their participation. No subject participated in more than
one of these experiments.
Apparatus and Procedure
Subjects performed the experiment individually in isolated rooms. After being
greeted by the researcher and signing a consent form, they were seated in a room
containing an Apple eMac. The experiments were presented within the MATLAB
framework using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Each experiment took
about 45 minutes to complete. After completing the experiment, subjects were debriefed
first with a description of the experiment on the computer, then verbally by the
researcher, and finally, thanked for their participation.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment was based largely on the experiments of Knowlton and Squire,
and Palmeri and Flanery, who found that subjects were able to identify members of a
multidimensional category while viewing them embedded in a stream of stimuli
(Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). Experiment 1 presented subjects
with a stream of multidimensional stimuli, some of which were generated randomly and
some of which came from a prototype. I hypothesized that subjects would eventually be
able to see a pattern hidden in a string of random elements, and therefore would pick out
these instances as being “in the category.” Importantly, in order to perform this task,
subjects would have to attend to both dimensions of the stimuli. Additionally, I
hypothesized that size and standard deviation of a category would impact the ease with
which a person can notice a multidimensional category among noise. Specifically, I
expect that the smaller the standard deviation of a category, and the greater the
membership of a category, the more salient it would be, and subjects will be most likely
to create multidimensional categories in the low standard deviation – high category
membership condition.
There were three main differences between the original experiments and the
current one: a) The stimuli – in this experiment, the stimuli were circles with radial lines
that can vary by size of the circle and angle of the line as opposed to the original
experiments which used dot patterns that could vary along two dimensions, b) the
category – in this experiment, the category prototype was randomly selected for each
subject as opposed to the original experiment in which a predetermined horseshoe shaped
category was used for each subject, and c) the cover story – subjects were explicitly
informed that they do not know the categories they were sorting stimuli into, while in the
original experiments subjects were either amnesiacs or were temporary amnesiacs (i.e.,
tricked into thinking they had seen the stimuli before when they had not).
11

Method
Stimuli and Design
Participants were shown 1000 images of circles with radial lines that were a
randomized mixture of category and non-category members. The circle could vary
continuously along its size dimension and the radial line could vary continuously along
its angle dimension (Figure 1). For each subject, a stimulus was chosen randomly to be
the category prototype from the potential stimulus space. Category members were
generated by adding Gaussian noise to each of the stimulus dimensions of the prototype.
Non-category members were generated by sampling from a uniform distribution of the
stimulus space and adding Gaussian noise to each dimension. A clear example of this
type of category can be seen picked out by the ellipse in the lower right hand corner of
Figure 2 panel 5, in which each point represents one of the last 900 stimuli that the
subject was shown. A green circle means the subject placed the stimulus into “the
category,” while a black plus sign means that placed it out of “the category.” The large
cluster in the corner shows that many of the stimuli the subject saw were very close in
their feature dimensions.
In order to investigate the importance of category properties on people’s
sensitivity to multiple dimensions, the standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution
applied to the category prototype was varied as a between subjects factor with three
levels: low, medium, and high deviation. Additionally, the number of category members
also varied as a between subjects factor, with some subjects seeing 25%, 50%, or 75% of
their stimuli generated from the category prototype. It is hypothesized that the more
similar the category members are to each other (i.e., the lower the standard deviation) and
the more category members that there are, the more likely the subjects will be to make a
complex category. These two factors made for a three-by-three between subjects
factorial design. For each subject, the remaining percentage of stimuli, the non-category
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members, were selected randomly from the potential stimulus space, regardless of the
location of the category prototype.
Participants
There were 55 subjects in this experiment, and the experiment program randomly
assigned each to one of the conditions. For the low-density condition, five subjects saw
the low category membership condition, four saw the medium category membership
condition, and six saw high category membership condition. For the medium-density
condition, eight saw the low category membership condition, eight saw the medium
category membership condition, and six saw the high category membership condition.
For the high-density condition, seven saw the low category membership condition, six
saw the medium category membership condition, and five saw the high category
membership condition.
Procedures
Subjects were instructed that they would see a series of circles with lines in them,
and that their job was to determine which images are “in the group” and which “are not.”
Additionally, they were reassured that “It may take some time to understand the nature of
the group, but a pattern should become evident with time. Don't get discouraged!” After
reading these instructions, subjects viewed the stimuli serially, and while viewing each,
were asked to indicate whether the drawing “is from the group” or “not from the group,”
by pressing one of two keys on a standard computer keyboard. Subjects received no
feedback throughout the experiment.
Results
Descriptives
The primary question of analysis is what criteria did subjects use when creating
their categories? To this end, it is important to know whether they performed the task of
categorizing at all and how well they did on an objective measure. On average, subjects
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put 358 exemplars into “the category,” with a standard deviation of 201 (see Table 1 for
results broken down by condition). One subject put no exemplars into the category while
another put only one.
Although to the subject’s perspective there was no correct or incorrect response, it
is possible to compare their categorization decisions to how the stimuli were generated
(that is, from the category prototype or randomly for the non-category members). On
average, subjects categorized 59% of the stimuli in accordance with how they were
generated (Table 1). Since the non-category members could have any possible set of
features, including the same features as the category prototype, even knowing the
information used to generate the category would not assure 100% correct performance.
On average, if subjects had known the generating information, they would have been able
to correctly categorize 87% of the stimuli, with the low standard deviation – high
category membership condition being the easiest and the high standard deviation – low
category membership being the most difficult (Table 1).
Modeling
In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with a stream of stimuli, some
perturbations of a prototype and others randomly generated. I hypothesized that subjects
would see a pattern across the dimensions of the stimuli in the string of random elements,
and therefore would pick out these instances as being “in the category.” Furthermore, I
hypothesized that this categorization behavior would be moderated by an increase in
category standard deviation, and a decrease in category membership. In order to infer
subjects’ sorting strategy, each subject’s data were represented in three dimensional
space, with the first dimension being size of the circle, the second being angle of the line,
and the third a binary dimension of whether the subject said the stimulus was “in the
category.” Once in this format, a series of models were fit to individual subject’s data,
each one representing a different categorization strategy, with the best fitting model being
the one that best divides the stimuli subjects said were “in the category” from ones
14

subjects said were “out of the category”. Five different models were fit: two lines, two
bands, and an ellipse. The lines represent setting a single criterion along one of the
dimensions, with one model being a vertical line, representing a one-dimensional sorting
strategy based on circle size, and the other being a horizontal line, representing a onedimensional sorting strategy based on line angle. The bands represent selecting out a
narrow range of features along one dimension, with non-category members have values
both greater and less than the category members. One band model was a vertical band,
representing a one-dimensional strategy where subjects categorize based on a limited
range of circle sizes, and the other was a horizontal band, representing a one-dimensional
strategy where subjects categorize based on a limited range of line angles. The final
model fit was an ellipse, representing a two-dimensional strategy where subjects
categorize based on a combination of ranges of circle sizes and line angles. Figure 2
shows examples of subject’s data with the best fitting model plotted on top.
Additionally, a random model was calculated to see if subjects just randomly
assigned the exemplars to a category, based on the frequency of the subjects’ indication
of an exemplar being in the category, specifically, percent designated in category,
squared plus percent designated out of category, squared. For example, in guessing the
subject’s performance, if a subject put 90% of the stimuli into the category, you would
get 90% of the in the category members correct by guessing “in the category” 90% of the
time and you would get 10% of the “out of the category” stimuli correct by guessing “out
of the category” 10% of the time. Therefore, without assuming a structure to the
responses, you could correctly guess the subject’s response 82% of the time. A twodimensional linear model (that is, two perpendicular lines), however, was not fit because:
a) The categories were designed based on the intersection of two Gaussian distributions,
so the optimal response would be circular, and b) a two dimensional linear model could
not detect a two dimensional category that was not at the corner of the stimulus space,
while an elliptical model could select out a complex category in any part of the space.
15

Model fitting was performed using percent correct as the fit value to be
maximized, which was calculated by summing the number of in-category members on
one side of the boundary along with the out-of-category members on the other side and
dividing by the total number of exemplars. Since subjects were by necessity guessing at
the beginning of the experiment, the first 100 trials were considered training and the
models were fit to the last 900 trials. Each model was fit to the data and adjusted so as to
maximize the percent correct.
In order to cross validate the models and make sure the ellipse model was not
given an undue advantage for having more parameters, model performance was
calculated by holding out 10 stimuli without replacement, and fitting the models to the
remaining data (which include previously held out stimuli). These models were used to
predict the category membership of the held out stimuli. This process was repeated until
all of the stimuli have been held out, and predictions made of their category membership.
Once each model had predicted the membership of every stimulus, the models were
compared based on percent correct predictions of the held out stimuli. If the elliptical
model is superior solely because of its increased parameters, it will over-fit the data given
to the model, and will do a poorer job of predicting the held out data. Because the
primary question is if subjects use both dimensions in constructing their categories, the
first concern is if any of the models fit better than the random model, and the next
concern is if the elliptical model performed better than the other linear model.
Since the analysis depends on dividing the “in the category” from the “out of the
category,” the models were fit to the data of the 53 subjects who put more than 10
exemplars into the category. Since the primary question of interest is how many
dimensions did the subject attend to, results are collapsed across band and linear models
of the same dimensions. For comparison, 95% confidence intervals are included where
sample size allows. Overall, the majority of subjects (68% ± 12) were best fit by models
along the angle dimension (Table 2). More importantly, only 13% ± 9 of the subjects
16

were best fit by the ellipse model, indicating that most subjects were not attending to both
dimensions. The two conditions with the highest percentage of subjects who were best fit
by the ellipse model were the high category membership conditions with either the low or
medium standard deviations, indicating that when underlying category structure was
more visible and cohesive, subjects were more likely to attend to multiple dimensions in
constructing their categories. Likewise, the low category membership conditions were
the only conditions where subjects’ responses were best fit by the random model,
indicating that when underlying category structure is not easily visible, subjects may have
a difficult time constructing any coherent category.
Discussion
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether the multidimensional categorization
behavior seen as a byproduct in the experiments of Knowlton and Squire, and Palmeri
and Flanery would be present in an experiment designed to test multidimensional
categorization (Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). I hypothesized that
when subjects were shown a stream of stimuli, some created from a multidimensional
prototype and others created randomly, they would be able to distinguish the ones created
from the prototype and thereby develop a multidimensional category. Additionally, I
hypothesized both that the more exemplars derived from the prototype that there were,
and the smaller the standard of deviation that there was, the greater the proportion of
subjects that would create a multidimensional category.
This experiment found no evidence for the first hypothesis. Overall, only 13% ±
9 of the subjects created multidimensional categories, a percentage seemingly not
reflective of the vast amounts of multidimensional categories that people use on a daily
basis. Tellingly, this number is only slightly higher than the results Medin and colleagues
found in their original category creation experiments before they introduced background
knowledge (Medin et al., 1987). Results for the second hypothesis are a little more
17

mixed. In instances where there were a high number of category members, almost four
times as many subjects created multidimensional categories than the medium or low
conditions. Still, this means that less than a third of the subjects in this condition created
multidimensional categories, and this in the heavy-handed situation where three out of
every four stimuli the subjects see should resemble each other. Similarly, only subjects
in the condition with the low number of category members were best fit by the random
model, indicating that they were having the hardest time categorizing according to any
dimension. While there still may be order to their responses that was not picked up by
the models (such as putting every fourth stimulus into the category), they did not divide
up the stimulus space according to either of the two stimulus dimensions. It seems that
no matter which dimension (or dimensions) they were attending to, they did not notice
any area of features appearing more frequently than any other.
This experiment has two implications. First, it adds to the evidence that
multidimensional categorization is not the default behavior of subjects who are creating
categories in a laboratory setting. Second, it indicates that the behavior described by
Knowlton and Squire, and Palmeri and Flanery as categorization behavior may not be
multidimensional categorization or it may actually be some other type of behavior
altogether. As discussed earlier, the dot-pattern stimuli used by Knowlton and Squire,
and Plameri and Flanery that were category members all had an upside-down “U” shape,
which was perhaps a familiar enough shape that the dimensions were perceived as a
unified whole rather than a collection of points in two dimensions. It is also possible that
people have the ability to discern order from chaos, without being able to identify what
that order is, and this was the behavior that had been considered to be intact
categorization in amnesiacs.
An unforeseen confound to Experiment 1 was that, during debriefing, some
subjects reported constructing their category based on the smoothness of the radial line.
When the line was at either 90°, 180°, 270°, or 360°, it was straight and smooth. At other
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angles, it became squiggly – a problem in computer graphics called aliasing. The
smoothness of the line, therefore, became an unanticipated third dimension for some
subjects that was not included in the modeling of their categorization behavior. This
problem led to the use of new stimuli in Experiments 2 and 3, and in the future, the
current experiment should be replicated with stimuli that are purely two-dimensional.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 2
This experiment attempted to more naturalistically reflect the feedback people
receive when they learn new categories. The original category creation experiments grew
out of a feeling of the artificiality of categorization experiments in which subjects were
asked to learn a category while receiving feedback after every category judgment. This is
very different from category learning experiences in the real world, where someone is
neither going to confirm you every time you make a correct category judgment or correct
you every time you make an incorrect judgment, especially considering that most
category judgments remain unvoiced. The traditional unsupervised category creation
experiment may have gone too far in the opposite direction, however, and has presented
category learning as occurring in a social vacuum – however the subject wants to
organize the stimuli is okay with the experimenter. Surely a person will receive some
feedback from those around them when trying to learn a category that is new to them, or
even if constructing a category new to the society. In this vein, Experiment 2 replicates
Experiment 1 but provides subjects with minimal feedback. Specifically, subjects are
never told if any categorization judgment is correct or incorrect, but are instead
intermittently given their percent correct score.
Method
Stimuli and design
Like Experiment 1, a category exemplar is selected for each subject, and
permutations of that exemplar are made for the category members, while non-category
members are created by randomly sampling the potential stimulus space. Fifty percent of
the stimuli were created by permuting the prototype, and fifty percent were created by
random sampling.
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During Experiment 1, some subjects reported basing their category decisions on
whether the radial line was smooth (i.e., aliased), an unanticipated emergent third
dimension. Therefore, two new stimulus types were created – an alien cell that varied
continuously by the color of its nucleus and the length of its mitochondria (see Figure 3
for examples of the cells) and line drawings of human faces, which varied continuously
by the distance between their eyes, and the distance between their nose and mouth. (see
Figure 4 for examples of the faces). The alien cells were created to have two dimensions
that were perceptually distinct, while the faces were created to have two dimensions that
were perceptually unified. A difference in performance between the two stimuli might
shed light on the stimuli used in by Palmeri and Flanery, and Knowlton and Squire, for it
would show that when subjects are able to unify dimensions, they may display
categorization behavior that appears to be complex but is actually simple, such as in
responding to the inverted “U” in the Palmeri and Flanery, and Knowlton and Squire
experiments.
There has been much research into the perception of faces indicating that they are
treated differently than most other stimuli (Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). For
example, humans have an area of the fusiform gyrus that responds preferentially to facelike objects (McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997), and newborns will prefer to orient
themselves towards face-like objects (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991).
Nevertheless, even though people are sensitive to what’s called the first-order relations of
a face (eyes over nose over mouth), they are also aware of the second-order relations of a
face – the distance between the eyes and the distance between the nose and the mouth.
For instance, Haig showed that subjects are able to differentiate between an “original
face” and one that had been modified to have its second-order relations changed (Haig,
1984). Additionally, categorization research done by Nosofky using line drawings of
faces that were categorized along the same second-order dimensions showed that people
are able to learn categories that vary along these dimensions (Nosofsky, 1991). These
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findings indicate that faces are suitable for the task of comprising categories that differ
along two dimensions.
Participants
There were 29 participants in the alien cell version of the experiment, and 30 in
the face version.
Procedures
The procedure of Experiment 2 was exactly the same as Experiment 1, except
subjects were told that they would receive feedback “every once in a while.” They were
told that they would see a series of images, some of which form a group and some of
which do not, and that it was their job to determine which is which. Although not
explicitly told this, subjects were presented with a screen displaying their percent correct
score after every 100 trials for those 100 trials.
Results
Descriptives
In the alien cell version of the experiment, subjects put an average of 581 stimuli
into “the category,” with a standard deviation of 101. On average, subjects categorized
70% of the stimuli in accordance with how they were generated and if subjects had
known the generating information, they would have been able to correctly categorize
89% of the stimuli. In the faces version of the experiment, subjects put an average of 557
stimuli into “the category,” with a standard deviation of 120. On average, subjects
categorized 66% of the stimuli in accordance with how they were generated and if
subjects had known the generating information, they would have been able to correctly
categorize 90% of the stimuli. In both versions, every subject put stimuli into “the
category.”
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Modeling
Modeling for Experiment 2 was performed exactly the same as for Experiment 1.
All subjects were included in the models, and models were fit to all of their data
excluding the first block of 100 trials. I hypothesized that subjects would create
multidimensional categories when given minimal feedback, and this would be displayed
by their data being best fit by the two-dimensional ellipse model.
For the “alien cells” version, six subjects were best fit by a line across the color
dimension, five were best fit by a line across the length dimension, three were best fit by
a band across the color dimension, two were best fit by a band across the length
dimension, thirteen were best fit by the ellipse model, and none were best fit by the
random model (see Figure 5 for results collapsed across model to show which dimension
or dimensions subjects primarily attended to). For the faces version, four subjects were
best fit by a line across the eye distance dimension, three were best fit by a line across the
nose/mouth distance dimension, seven were best fit by a band across the eye distance
dimension, one was best fit by a band across the nose/mouth distance dimension, fifteen
were best fit by the ellipse model, and none were best fit by the random model (Figure 5).
Discussion
Experiment 2 was conducted to test the hypothesis that, when subjects are given
minimal feedback on their performance, they will be more willing/able to create
multidimensional categories. In the alien cell version of the experiment, 45% ± 17 of the
subjects created multidimensional categories and in faces version of the experiment, 50%
± 17 of the subjects created multidimensional categories. Compared with 13% ± 9 of the
subjects who made multidimensional categories in Experiment 1 without getting
feedback (or, more appropriately, the 6% ± 14 of subjects in the medium proportion
condition), this constitutes a significant increase in percentage of subjects creating
multidimensional categories. Indeed, when Medin et al. showed subjects
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multidimensional objects that they had background knowledge of (Experiment 7), only
39% of the subjects used multidimensional sorting (Medin et al., 1987).
What is it about receiving feedback that allowed or inspired subjects to categorize
complexly? One possibility is that subjects were hypothesis testing, and that when all of
their attempts at unidimensional categorization did not produce acceptable results, they
expended the extra effort to attend to multiple dimensions. Another possibility is that
there was a social pressure to try harder in the presence of the external judgment of
percent correct scores. All the subjects were college students, some of whom are very
sensitive about grades, and during debriefing, some seemed upset with themselves that
they had not performed as well as they hoped, even after they were assured that there
wasn’t truly a correct answer. A third possibility is that this experiment mirrors the social
give and take of communication enough to spur a more natural category structure.
While this study was conducted as a follow-up to Experiment 1’s no feedback
condition, Experiment 1 cannot truly be seen as a baseline for this experiment because of
the difference in stimuli, and though it is unlikely it is possible that these findings are due
to the change in stimuli. Future follow-ups to Experiment 2 should contain a no feedback
condition. Follow-ups should also test the various explanations for these findings. To
test if subjects were hypothesis testing, the same experiment can be performed using an
eyetracker, where subjects’ attention to dimensions can be recorded on a trial-by-trial
basis, and the allotment of their attention can be analyzed over time. The social pressure
hypothesis can be tested by modulating the importance of the percent correct score, such
as by preceding the experiment with a fictitious previous high score that is either high or
low. The interpersonal effects of the feedback can be tested by increasing the
interpersonal way that the way in which the feedback is given, such as having it reported
by a recorded voice, rather than by words on a computer screen. Furthermore, these
findings raise the question of how much feedback is enough to incite multidimensional
categorization, and future studies should test the effects different amounts of feedback,
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exploring the gap between the current experiment, where subjects received feedback nine
times, and the no feedback condition.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 3
This experiment was based on the act of taxonomists identifying new species in
the field. Taxonomists decide whether entities belong to a known category or come from
a new, unknown category. New categories are usually dimensionally rich, e.g., many
aspects of the plant need to be considered. Like the subjects in Spalding and Murphy’s
experiment, where subjects were already familiar with the features of arctic and
equatorial objects, the subjects in Experiment 3 were made familiar with the features that
comprise the new categories that they create (Spalding & Murphy, 1996). Unlike
Spalding and Murphy’s subjects, however, for whom the features were causally related
and thus tapped a deeper underlying knowledge structure, the feature correlations in this
experiment only extend to the perceptual features of the category members with no
underlying causal structure. Additionally, while the subjects in Spalding and Murphy’s
experiment constructed their category out of the items that were directly linked to their
prior knowledge, prior knowledge in this experiment will only serve as a grounding for
stimuli with a never before seen arrangement of features.
In this vein, Experiment 3 utilized the stimuli from Experiment 2. Instead of
randomly selecting the location for a category, however, each of the four corners of the
space was used to make a category. Subjects were then trained on three of these
categories to simulate the prior knowledge a taxonomist might have. During testing,
subjects were presented with instances from all four categories and given an option to say
that an exemplar “does not fit the three learned categories,” phrased so as to reduce
demand characteristics to construct a cohesive category. I hypothesized that, like
taxonomists, subjects would use multiple dimensions to recognize previously unknown
arrangement of features, and would identify these as not belonging to any known
category – the first step to creating a new category (also the largest step, after deciding
how to convert your name into Latin).
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Method
Stimuli and design
This experiment had three phases: two training phases and a testing phase. In
order to facilitate learning, the first training phase had subjects passively view ten
instances of each of the three known categories so they could get a sense of the stimulus
space (exactly which three categories were taught were rotated between subjects).
During the second training phase, subjects were presented with randomly mixed members
of the three known categories and had to respond with which category the exemplar
belonged. During this phase, if they categorized the exemplar correctly, they were told
that the response was correct and were reminded what category they selected. If they
categorized the exemplar incorrectly, they were told that they were incorrect, and the
correct category membership was shown. This phase continued until subjects either
categorized 40 of the last 50 trials correctly or had gone through 200 training trials. Once
training was over, subjects entered the testing phase, where they were asked to categorize
exemplars of all four categories without feedback. They were given the three original
category options, as well as a fourth option of “this item does not fit any of the
categories.” During this phase, subjects saw 600 exemplars – 150 from each category
randomly mixed. The same stimuli from Experiment 2 are used in two different versions
of Experiment 3, namely, the alien cells and the faces.
Participants
Forty-three subjects participated in the “alien cell” version of the experiment and
30 subjects participated in the faces version.
Procedures
In the alien cell version of the experiment, subjects were told that they were
biologists working for NASA, who had recently discovered three different types of single
cell life on Mars. During learning they were instructed to learn these three different
types. During the testing phase, subjects were told that they were looking at a cell sample
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from another region of Mars, and were instructed to categorize the cells they saw, noting
if they see cells that they “believe the cell is a new species.” In the faces version of the
experiment, subjects were told they are planning a family reunion for a family with three
branches, and it is their job to seat the guests. During learning phase, they were
instructed to learn to identify members of each branch. During the testing phase, they
were told that they are organizing a family photo for people only related by blood, and
that it was their job to: a) group people by branch, and b) note if they see faces of anyone
that they “believe is from none of the clans.”
Results
Descriptives
In the alien cell version of the experiment, 21 out of 43 subjects learned the three
categories to criterion. During testing, subjects categorized an average of 50% of the
learned category members in accordance with their generating prototypes. Those
subjects who learned the categories to criterion during training categorized 50% in
accordance with their generating prototypes while those subjects who did not learn to
criterion only categorized 52% in accordance with their generating prototypes. If
subjects were able to perfectly use the learned generating prototypes, they would have
been able to get an average of 86% correct. Overall, subjects categorized 16% of the
unlearned exemplars according to their generating prototype, with subjects who learned
the categories correctly categorizing 23% and subjects who did not learn the categories
correctly categorizing 9%. On average, subjects put 63 exemplars into the “other”
category, with a standard deviation of 82. As this hints, nine subjects did not put any
exemplars into the “other” category during the testing phase, five of whom learned the
categories to criterion during training. Again, although subjects were told that they had
the option to put exemplars into the “other” category, it was not required.
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In the faces version of the experiment, 8 of the 30 subjects learned the three
categories to criterion. During testing, subjects categorized an average of 47% of the
learned category members in accordance with their generating prototypes. Those
subjects who learned the categories to criterion during training categorized 61% in
accordance with their generating prototypes while those subjects who did not learn to
criterion only categorized 43% in accordance with their generating prototypes. If
subjects were able to perfectly use the learned generating prototypes, they would have
been able to get an average of 86% correct. Overall, subjects categorized 12% of the
unlearned exemplars according to their generating prototype, with subjects who learned
the categories correctly categorizing 21% and subjects who did not learn the categories
correctly categorizing 9%. On average, subjects put 48 exemplars into the “other”
category, with a standard deviation of 59. Five subjects did not put any exemplars into
the “other” category during the testing phase, two of whom learned the three trained
categories to criterion.
Modeling
Analysis of Experiment 3 was performed in a manner similar to Experiment 1.
The main question was whether subjects were sensitive to both dimensions of the
stimulus when creating their “other” category. For the purpose of analysis, what subjects
marked as one of the three learned categories were considered to be one category, and the
stimuli subjects marked as “other” were considered to be the second category. With only
two groups, the models from Experiment 1 were also applied to these data. Recall that, if
subjects were sensitive to both dimensions, the ellipse model would fit best. Analyses
were performed on the data from all subjects who placed more than 10 exemplars into the
“other” category, starting 100 trials into the testing phase.
In the alien cell version, 32 subjects placed more than 10 exemplars into the
“other” category. In fitting the models to subjects data, twelve subjects were best fit by a
line across the color dimension, three were best fit by a line across the length dimension,
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two were best fit by a band across the color dimension, two were best fit by a band across
the length dimension, and thirteen were best fit by the random model. See Figure 6,
where the results are collapsed across linear models to show which dimensions subjects
were attending to. None of the subjects’ categorizations of the “other” category were
best fit by the ellipse model, indicating that none of them accounted for both dimensions
in their created category.
In the face version, 22 subjects placed more than 10 exemplars into the “other”
category. Four of these were best fit by a line across the eye distance dimension, two
were best fit by a band along the eye distance dimension, three were best fit by the ellipse
model, and thirteen were best fit by the random model (Figure 6).
Discussion
Experiment 3 was conducted to test the hypothesis that if a person is
knowledgeable of other categories that are comprised of the same, multiple dimensions
that an unknown category is comprised of, they will be sensitive to those dimensions
when constructing a new category. This experiment did not provide evidence in support
of this hypothesis. Out of the 54 subjects, only three were best fit by the ellipse model,
about 6% ± 7. In fact, by far the best fitting model was the random model, which best fit
48% ± 13 of the subjects. This does not mean, however, that the subjects were making
category decisions randomly. First, the random model is dependent on the percentage of
stimuli put into the “other” category. With only 25% of the stimuli originating from this
category, the design of this experiment biases in favor of the random model. On average,
subjects placed only 9% of the stimuli into the “other” category. Since the random
category is dependent on the percentage of category members “in the category,” this low
category membership would make for an average random category fit of 84% correct.
Second, even if it appears that subjects were placing exemplars into the “other” category
randomly, they could still be sorting the three learned categories multidimensionally. For
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the purpose of analysis, however, these were all collapsed into one “learned” category. It
is possible that subjects who were best fit by the random model were using the “other”
category as a catch-all for hard to categorize exemplars that straddled the borders
between known categories, making this categorization appear random.
Similarly, collapsing the exemplars marked as coming from the three learned
category into one category for the sake of modeling can obscure other types of
categorization behavior. A number of subjects in both versions of the experiment
appeared to learn the original categories by learning to attend to one dimension, and then
if this doesn’t sufficiently classify the exemplar, to attend to the second. An example of
this can be seen in the left and middle panels of Figure 7, which show feedback during
training and subject’s response during training respectively. Even though this subject has
obviously learned the categories, looking to the right panel, which shows responses
during testing, you can see that the subject learned that any exemplar with a dark nucleus
is in one category, and if it has a light nucleus, then you have to look to the mitochondria
length to differentiate. When this subject saw cells with dark nuclei and short
mitochondria (the group not shown during training), their rule classified these cells along
with the cells with dark nuclei and long mitochondria. The black dots on Figure 7
represent the exemplars that the subject put into the “other” category and show that they
used this category for exemplars with extremely dark nuclei. This rule based behavior
seems similar to the behavior observed by Medin and colleagues who showed subjects
objects whose dimensions had three levels and asked them to make two categories, and
the subjects still created rules to divide the stimuli along one dimension (Medin et al.,
1987).
Category construction experiments have been a fruitful area for the proponents of
the “knowledge theory” of categorization (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999; Medin et al., 1987;
Spalding & Murphy, 1996). They show that subjects are able (or willing) to create
multidimensional categories when they align the to-be-categorized stimuli with
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categories already in their knowledge structure. The question remains, however, to what
extent subjects are creating a new category rather than applying an old one in a novel
way. Experiment 3 indicates that either: a) there is a limit of how sparse the already
existent categories can be for them to help subjects create a new multidimensional
category, or b) prior experiments showing the effects of knowledge on category creation
are in-fact just applying old multidimensional categories in new ways.
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CHAPTER 6
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Traditional categorization experiments have taken an all or none view towards
giving subjects feedback. Those that always give subjects feedback create an highly
stylized learning environment, while those who give no feedback see categorization
behavior in subjects that is highly unlike categorization behavior seen outside the lab.
These experiments examined different methods to induce subjects to create more realistic
categories with either a more realistic feedback setting (that is, the no feedback condition
and the little feedback condition in Experiments 1 and 2 respectively) or a more realistic
knowledge base (that is, the no knowledge condition and the little knowledge condition in
Experiments 1 and 3 respectively). Models were fit to their categorization decisions to
determine which dimensions subjects attended to when categorizing. Experiment 1 found
a minimal impact of size and similarity of category members on subjects’ propensity to
create the complex categories seen in categorization behavior outside of the lab.
Experiment 3 found no evidence that a prior familiarity with the category dimensions
increases multidimensional categorization of a new category. Experiment 2, however,
found provisional evidence that minimal feedback improves multidimensional
categorization. Additionally, Experiment 3 provides support that the increase in complex
categorization seen in Experiment 2 is due to the minimal feedback and not due to the
change in stimuli, since Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 used the same stimuli, and there
was minimal complex categorization in Experiment 3.
Prior experiments have found that subjects will create multidimensional
categories when extensively trained, when the features of the to-be-created categories are
informed by previously known categories, or when there is some task where subjects
need to use the items in addition to purely categorizing them. Of these three, it seems
that the last is most informative about the way that category creation occurs outside of the
lab. Most people, aside from Lewis Carol, do not create categories randomly or for
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amusement. They create them when they can be beneficial to understanding objects they
encounter or for predicting the behavior of new objects – exactly the reasons that
categorization is important to study. Complex category creation, however, counts as
higher-level cognition, and probably requires a fair amount of cognitive effort and
resources that people are, for the most part, unwilling to spend unless it is necessary or
will obviously benefit them. Just a little feedback, it seems, may also be enough to
encourage them to spend that energy.
Many of the traditional categorization experiments have utilized highly stylized
categories containing five or less exemplars and extensive trial-by-trial feedback.
Although researchers would like to generalize from these studies to the categories that
people use in their everyday life, the great difference between the extensive nature of
everyday categories and the limited nature of categories learned in the lab, coupled with
their overly attentive feedback structure, calls into question the external validity of these
findings. If subjects can be inspired to create complex categories on their own in the lab,
these categories can then be used as a more valid base to test theories of categorization
that have been proposed, such a the nature of their representation. Having subjects use
the category members in an effort to get them to construct complex categories, however,
may defeat the purpose of using abstract categories in categorization research, since
subjects have now assigned meaning to the categories (i.e., category members are now
seen as “doing something”). The findings of Experiment 2 indicate that a minimal
feedback structure may be a way to inspire complex category creation in subjects that is
better tailored to using that created category for future experiments.
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Figure 1. Examples of the circle and radial line stimulus space.
Note. Stimuli can take any intermittent value along either dimension.
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Figure 2. Example data and model fitting.
Note. 1) Linear model – size; 2) Linear model – angle; 3) Band model – size; 4) Band model – angle; 5) Elliptical model.
Green circles represent stimuli subjects placed into the category, while black plusses represent stimuli subjects placed out of the
category.
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Table 1. Experiment 1 Results – Descriptives
# In Category

Actual % Correct

Possible % Correct

LowSD-LowCat

354

51.2%

95.58%

LowSD-MedCat

464

60.7%

96.92%

LowSD-HiCat

148

80.8%

98.07%

MedSD-LowCat

360

42.5%

84.57%

MedSD-MedCat

339

62.6%

88.92%

MedSD-HiCat

434

60.3%

93.89%

HiSD - LowCat

485

52.2%

65.43%

HiSD-MedCat

454

54.6%

77.70%

HiSD-HiCat

171

72.9%

86.42%

Total

358

59.2%

87.4%

Condition
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Table 2. Experiment 1 results - Percent of performance accounted for by model
Standard Deviation Conditions
Category Membership
Conditions

Models

Low SD

Medium SD

High SD

Total

Low Category

Size
Angle
Ellipse
Random

0%
40%
0%
60%

33%
67%
0%
0%

0%
71%
14%
14%

11% ± 16
61% ± 21
6% ± 14
22% ± 19

Medium Category

Size
Angle
Ellipse
Random

25%
50%
25%
0%

13%
88%
0%
0%

17%
83%
0%
0%

17% ± 18
78% ± 19
6% ± 14
0%

High Category

Size
Angle
Ellipse
Random

0%
67%
33%
0%

17%
50%
33%
0%

0%
80%
20%
0%

6% ± 15
65% ± 21
29% ± 20
0%

Total

Size
Angle
Ellipse
Random

7% ± 16
53% ± 22
20% ± 20
20% ± 20

20% ± 17
70% ± 19
10% ± 15
0%

6% ± 17
78% ± 19
11% ± 15
6% ± 11

11% ± 9
68% ± 12
13% ± 9
8% ± 8

Note. 95% confidence intervals were only calculated for marginal means and totals due to sample size requirements. Additionally,
confidence intervals for cells with no occurrences cannot be calculated.
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Figure 3. Examples of the alien cell stimulus space.
Note. Stimuli can take any intermittent value along either dimension.
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Figure 4. Examples of the face stimulus space.
Note. Stimuli can take any intermittent value along either dimension.
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 results – Percent of performance accounted for by dimension.
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Figure 6. Experiment 3 results – Percent of performance accounted for by dimension.
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Random

Figure 7. An example subject from Experiment 3 displaying category expansion.
Note. The left graph is the feedback subject 3 received during training, the middle graph is their response, and the right graph is their
categorization behavior during testing. Note how the green category expands to fill up the empty space below it, indicating the subject
learned strategy where if it was a dark nucleus, it was in one category, but if it was a light nucleus, they attended to the mitochondria
length. Also, this subject here used the “other” category to indicate exemplars that had extremely dark nuclei.
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